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INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the plaintiffs and
appellees, Harrington Properties, Inc. ("HPI"), Robert L. Harrington ("Harrington"), and Jane R.
Harrington hereby petition the Court for a rehearing in this matter. As set forth below, on the
key point of whether additional loans were secured by an earlier deed of trust between the
parties, the Court's opinion, which was filed on November 27, 1998, is predicated specifically on
the Court's misapprehension of two facts critical to its holding and on a misapprehension of the
actual language of the trust deed.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from HPI's purchase of a residential building lot from
Marilyn Peterson ("Peterson"). Mrs. Peterson sold the lot to HPI pursuant to a promissory note
that was secured by a second-position trust deed (the "Trust Deed") on the property. The
principal question before this Court on appeal was whether on motion for partial summary
judgment the district court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, certain additional loans by
Mrs. Peterson were not secured by the Trust Deed because they were not evidenced by a
promissory note reciting that they were secured by that Trust Deed.
Harrington's motion for partial summary judgment sought a declaration that the monies
advanced by Peterson in and after February 1993 were not secured by the 1991 Trust Deed
because there was no writing evidencing such a securitization as required by clause (3) of the
Trust Deed. In partial response to the summary judgment motion, Peterson argued that
$4,898.81 of the advances was secured by paragraph 5 of the Trust Deed because it represented
funds paid directly to Guardian State Bank for interest due on the note secured by the first-place

1

As a matter of undisputed fact in the record, no part of the loans at issue on appeal was
used to pay any encumbrance, charge, or lien. Any such uses of the loans were excluded from
the Order by the district court. Indeed, on the legal issue, the district court agreed with this
Court's view of the operation of paragraph 5.
Except for the $4,898.81 noted above, Peterson did not contend below or on appeal that
the loans in question paid any encumbrance, charge, or lien. For that reason, Peterson made no
argument below or on appeal that the district court erred by failing to find that the loans were
secured by the Trust Deed under clause (2) with reference to paragraph 5.
Thus, because the Court misapprehended a fact critical to its holding, rehearing is proper.
2. The Court Misapprended the Reason for the Requested Additional Loans in February
1993, Thus Warranting a Rehearing.
In its Opinion, this Court recited as factual background that "[i]n February 1993,
Peterson, at Harrington's request, made another advance to Harrington of $69,626.84 to ensure
construction could be completed and to prevent foreclosure of the Guardian Bank construction
loan." (emphasis added). Opinion at 3. The Court then held that "Peterson advanced the
construction money to Harrington under these circumstances because the alternative was to allow
foreclosure of the Property, thereby impairing her own security interest," concluding "[t]hus
Peterson's 1993 advance to Harrington was made to protect her security interest in the Property."
Id at 5.
That conclusion is predicated on a misapprehension of a fact critical to the conclusion.
As noted above, there was no notice of default to Harrington on the Guardian State Bank note.
Moreover, Peterson did not contend before the district court or on appeal that Harrington was
about to default on that Note or that foreclosure was imminent. The Court's misapprehension of
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that fact is therefore fatal to its conclusion quoted above, and for that reason a rehearing is
warranted.
3. The Court's Consideration of Dragnet Clause Analysis Was Based on a
Misapprehension of the Trust Deed's Language. Thus Warranting a Rehearing.
Because it misapprehended the nature of the additional advances, this Court did not
correctly analyze the applicability of clause (3) of the Trust Deed except in its analysis
concerning "dragnet" clauses.2 Opinion at 5. However, this was an incorrect interpretation of
the Trust Deed and of the requirements in clause (3) for securing additional indebtedness, and a
misapprehension of the actual language of the Trust Deed.
A dragnet clause is one which makes real estate security for subsequent additional debts.
Such clauses typically are drafted with extremely broad language. For example, the dragnet
clause in the case cited by this Court stated that it was "to secure the payment of any and all
claims or demands now due or to become due now or hereafter contracted or incurred which the
said mortgagee or the holder hereof, from time to time, may have or hold against the mortgagors
or either of them." First Sec. Bank v. Shiew. 609 P.2d 952, 953 (Utah 1980). The question
before the Utah Supreme Court in Shiew was whether the extremely broad language of the
dragnet clause in that case was enforceable to secure a subsequent additional debt. The Supreme
Court held that such clauses would not be enforced unless "'the advances are of the same kind
and quality or relate to the same transaction'" as the principal obligation or unless '"the document
evidencing the subsequent advance refers to the mortgage as providing security therefor.'" Id at
954 (citation omitted).

While the Court does not identify the specific provision that it believed constitutes a dragnet clause,
the Court apparently relied on clause (3) because the Court refers to "additional advances".
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Under this authority, a court must make a two-step analysis when analyzing whether
subsequent advances are secured by a trust deed. First, the court must make the threshold
determination of whether there is a dragnet clause that purports to cover the subsequent loans. If
so, the second question is whether the dragnet clause is enforceable under Shiew.
This Court failed to make the first inquiry. In fact, there is no dragnet clause in the Trust
Deed, either similar to or functionally equivalent to the provision in Shiew, and this Court does
not point to one. More importantly, clause 3 in the Trust Deed is in fact an anti-dragnet clause.
Rather than stating that the trust deed secures all other indebtedness as in Shiew. under clause (3)
the trust deed secures additional loans only "when evidenced by a promissory note or notes
reciting that they are secured bv this Deed of Trust." (emphasis added). The absence of any
dragnet clause and the express contrary language ends the first prong of the Shiew analysis. It
was therefore unnecessary for the Court to consider the next question of whether the clause
would be enforceable because the additional advances were "related" to the original loan. Under
this analysis, the district court correctly held that the monies loaned by Peterson pursuant to the
February 18 Letter Agreement were not secured by the Trust Deed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reconsider this matter and either affirm the
declaratory judgment of the district court or grant a rehearing.
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
Counsel for the petitioners hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good faith and
not for delay.

6

DATED this ^ d a y of December, 1998.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jard
/ Bfrent D.
^Eric D. Ba
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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day of December, 1998,1 have caused to be mailed by United

States mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEES'
PETITION FOR REHEARING to the following:
Harold C. Verhaaren, Esq.
John K. Mangum, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

440863

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
HARRINGTON PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation; ROBERT L.
HARRINGTON and JANE R.
HARRINGTON,

:
:

ORDER

:

Civil No. 940904680CN

Plaintiffs,
v.
MARILYN HAMILTON PETERSON; and
GLOBAL MOTOR INNS, a Utah
corporation,

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendants.
ooOoo
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Their
Fourth Cause of Action and Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment came on for hearing before the Court on November 4,
1996.

Plaintiffs were represented by James S. Jardine.

Defendants were represented by John K. Mangum.

Based upon the

memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties and the arguments
of counsel at the hearing, and the orders of the court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied on

the basis that there remain material issues of fact in dispute.

2.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the

Fourth Cause of Action of their Third Amended Complaint is
granted, except for $4,898.81 in funds paid to Guardian State
Bank.

Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory

judgment that monies advanced to Robert L. Harrington and/or
Harrington Properties, Inc. by defendant Peterson beyond their
Agreement dated December 8, 1992, and pursuant to an agreement
made in February, 1993, were not secured by the Deed of Trust,
dated June 21, 1991, and referred to by the plaintiffs as the
"Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II", except for $4,898.81 in funds paid
to Guardian State Bank.
3,

Pursuant to Rule 52(a), the following is a brief

written statement of the grounds for the Order:
a.

The Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, dated June 21,

1991, provides in part that it is given for the purpose of
securing " . . .

(3) the payment of such additional loans or

advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor or his successor or
assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting
that they are secured by that deed of trust . . . "

Sunset Oaks

Trust Deed II, p. 2.
b.

The Court finds that the monies advanced by

defendant Peterson pursuant to the February 18, 1993 letter were
"additional loans or advances" within the meaning of clause (3),
and that clause (3) applies to the monies loaned or advanced by
Peterson pursuant to the February 18, 1993 letter agreement,
except as to the $4,898.81 paid to Guardian State Bank, which
2

payments were secured under clause (2) of the Sunset Oaks Trust
Deed II by reference to paragraph 5 thereof.
c.

Except as to the $4,898.81 paid to Guardian State

Bank, the Court finds that clauses (1), (2) and (4) of the Sunset
Oaks Trust Deed II do not apply to the new advances made after
those covered by the December 8, 1992 Agreement, as contended by
defendants, and that the interpretation of those clauses asserted
by defendants is artificial.
d.

The Court finds that the February 18, 1993 letter

from Robert L. Harrington to Marilyn Hamilton Peterson is the
only document which reflects the agreement between the parties
with respect to the advances made by defendant Peterson after
those covered by the December 8, 1992 Agreement.

The Court does

not decide whether the February 18, 1993 letter constitutes a
"promissory note" within the meaning of clause (3) of the Sunset
Oaks Trust Deed II.

The Court does conclude that the

February 18, 1993 letter does not recite that the monies advanced
thereunder are secured by Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, as required
by clause (3).
DATED this

tO

day of December, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

Approved As To Form:

£M

K. Mangum
^~~
NIELSEN Sc SENIOR, P.C.
201345.03

inorable Sandra Peu]&r/..,-, \u-~
D i s t r i c t Judge

Exhibit B

Harold C. Verhaaren, USB No. 3325
John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HARRINGTON PROPERTIES, INC. a Utah
corporation; ROBERT L. HARRINGTON and
JANE R. HARRINGTON,
Plaintiffs,
v.

MARILYN HAMILTON PETERSON; and
GLOBAL MOTOR INNS, a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)i
i
j1
>
]
])

MEMORANDUM OF
DEFENDANTS OPPOSING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND SUPPORTING
DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
(Oral Argument Requested)

1

Civil No. 940904680 CN

)

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendants, by and through their undersigned counsel, respectfully submit the following
Memorandum opposing the Motion of Plaintiffs for Partial Summary Judgment on their Fourth
Cause of Action of their Third Amended Complaint, which Motion was dated July 17, 1996.
This Memorandum is also offered in support of the Cross Motion of Defendants for Partial
Summary Judgment.
51635 PE8632 10

INTRODUCTION
The principal persons to this dispute are a businesswoman without any formal legal
training (Defendant Marilyn Peterson) and a member of the Utah State Bar (Plaintiff Robert
Harrington), who agreed to buy a single lot from Mrs. Peterson in an arm's-length credit
transaction. Mr. Harrington gave Mrs. Peterson a Promissory Note in payment of the full
purchase price of the lot which was secured by a Purchase Money Trust Deed. Mr. Harrington
then proceeded on his own, through his closely held corporation, Harrington Properties, Inc.,
to attempt to build a luxury spec home on that property (the "Sunset Oaks Property").
Peterson was not, and should not properly be viewed in any way as a joint venturer with
Harrington.

Had Harrington been able to adequately finance the construction project he

undertook on his own, as he originally projected and represented, Mrs. Peterson would have had
no further involvement in the transaction, other than to collect payment of her Promissory Note.
However, Harrington later filed a personal bankruptcy and then lacked the means, contrary to
his original representations, to complete his undertaking.
Knowing that Mrs. Peterson had access to substantial sums of money, and apparently
lacking other ready means of financing, Harrington requested additional funding from
Mrs. Peterson to complete his original project. Fearing the potential loss of her ability to collect
the money owed her if the project were not properly completed, Mrs. Peterson obliged and
advanced the remaining funds necessary to substantially complete the construction of the luxury
home which Mr. Harrington had already partly built to the point that plans could not easily be
changed.

51635 PE8632 10
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While the narrow issue presented by Plaintiffs' motion is whether monies loaned in 1993
by Mrs. Peterson were secured by her Purchase Money Trust Deed of June 1991 (usually
referred to by Plaintiffs as die Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, because recorded after the trust deed
securing the construction loan from Guardian State Bank to Harringtons), the resolution of this
issue is not properly made by looking only at one small phrase of the Purchase Money Trust
Deed, as Plaintiffs suggest. Mischaracterizing the nature of those 1993 advances as separate and
unrelated loans, Plaintiffs focus on the only language they can find to support their strained
interpretation, and totally ignore the multitude of other provisions of the Purchase Money Trust
Deed which clearly secure, independent of any later writing, the further advances made by
Mrs. Peterson to complete construction.
ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS
Paramount among the material facts which are undisputed, even undisputable, are the
following provisions of the Purchase Money Trust Deed (the "Trust Deed" or "Deed of Trust"),
which provides, in relevant part, on page two of that Trust Deed, as follows:
For the purpose of securing:
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date in
the principal sum of $95,000.00, made by Trustor, payable to the order of
Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest^ therein set forth, and
any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof;
(2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor fMr. Harringtonl herein
contained:
(3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made
to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or
notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and

51635 PE8632.10
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(4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary TMrs. Peterson!
under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein
provided.
To Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees:
(1) To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or
demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore promptly and in good and
workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or
destroyed thereon; . . . to do all other acts which from the character or use of
said property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not
excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part hereof is being
obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said
property. Trustor further agrees:
(a)
to commence construction promptly and to pursue
same with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance with
plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b) to allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during
construction.

(7) Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein
provided, then Beneficiary or, trustee but without obligation so to do and without
notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any
obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent
as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof, . . . and in
exercising any such powers., incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its
absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of
title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees.
(8) To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder
by Beneficiary or trustee, with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of
percent per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured
hereby.
Purchase Money Deed of Trust dated June 21, 1991, at p. 2. [Emphasis added]

51635 PE8632.10

-4-

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' PURPORTED UNDISPUTED FACTS
Defendants object to the following numbered paragraphs from Plaintiffs* Memorandum
which were claimed by Plaintiffs to be undisputed, but which Defendants do in fact dispute:
Defendants object to the last sentence of paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' statement of claimed
undisputed facts. Mrs. Peterson did not propose to advance new money for construction, but
rather agreed to Mr. Harrington's request that she advance such funds. Peterson's Supplemental
Affidavit at H ' s 20 and 23.
Defendants object and assert that paragraph 7c of Plaintiffs' statement of claimed
undisputed facts mischaracterizes the December 8, 1992 Agreement. Paragraph 8 of that 1992
Agreement reads:

M

8. Collateral. This Agreement is secured by a Trust Deed dated June 21,

1991 more particularly referred to in paragraph 1 [Recital "A"] above." Recital "A" more
completely describes the Purchase Money Trust Deed which Mr. Harrington signed in favor of
Mrs. Peterson. As explained more fully below, Defendants contend that the language of the
Purchase Money Trust Deed was sufficient in and of itself to secure the monies advanced under
the December 8, 1992

Agreement.

However, the language from paragraph 8 of that

December 8, 1992 Agreement makes it clear that the parties to the December 8 Agreement, at
the time of its execution, intended and expressly provided that the provisions of that Agreement
also be secured by the Purchase Money Deed of Trust. No new Promissory Note or other
document was necessary to accomplish said result.
Defendants next object to the characterization of certain aspects of the understanding
reached by the parties in February of 1993, as set forth in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' claimed

51635 PE8632 10
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statement of undisputed facts.

In response to further requests from Mr. Harrington for

additional funds to complete construction, Mrs. Peterson agreed to provide them under the same
terms as those stated in the December 8, 1992 Agreement.

Mr. Harrington's letter of

February 18, 1993, which nowhere mentions HPI, was unsolicited, and only incompletely
addresses the understanding then reached by the parties, seemed to Mrs. Peterson to be correct
to the extent the Agreement was covered, and Mrs. Peterson, after receiving it, took no further
action to respond thereto, except to advance additional funds as she then believed she needed to
do to protect her interests in the collateral which secured her original promissory note from
Mr. Harrington. Peterson's Supplemental Affidavit at ^ 23.
Defendants object to the unsupported conclusion in paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' purported
undisputed facts, that no other document evidenced the February 1993 agreement of the parties.
All of the checks signed by Mrs. Peterson advancing further funds in 1993 are additional
documents reflecting and memorializing the agreement made by the parties in February, 1993
for Peterson to loan additional funds which totaled a principal of $70,076.44.

Peterson's

Supplemental Affidavit at S 24, and Exhibit "R" thereto.
Defendants further object to the statements of Plaintiffs in their paragraphs 11 and 12 of
their claimed statement of purported undisputed facts, wherein Plaintiffs erroneously claimed that
Mr. Harrington never agreed in any document that any monies loaned in connection with the
February 18, 1993 letter were secured by the Purchase Money Trust Deed. Those monies were
so secured, according to the provisions of both the Purchase Money Trust Deed itself, and by

51635.PE8632.10
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virtue of the last sentence of the first paragraph of the February 18, 1993 letter, as more fully
explained below.
Defendants next object to that part of paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs' statement of purported
undisputed facts asserting that Harrington's acceptance of the dinger's offer was based on a
prior conversation with Mrs. Peterson. Mr. Harrington accepted the offer of the Clingers on
December 5, 1993, and then subsequently notified Mrs. Peterson that he had so acted.
Peterson's Supplemental Affidavit at K 27.
Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' statement of purported undisputed facts is totally irrelevant
to this motion of Plaintiffs. It also erroneously suggests that the later subordination agreement
required some consent of Mr. Harrington, which it did not, to be effective, as explained in the
Memorandum of Defendants dated the 6th day of September, 1995, at pages 26-28. Moreover,
the original agreement to subordinate the Purchase Money Trust Deed to the trust deed
Harringtons gave Guardian State Bank was only initially intended to be for a period of nine
months. See Purchase Money Trust Deed Note, evidenced by Exhibit HC,f to First Affidavit of
Mrs. Peterson.
Defendants next object to paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' statement of purported undisputed
facts, insofar as it erroneously states that the supposed payoff amount of $251,897.32 was a
figure supplied by Mrs. Peterson, which it was not, and insofar as Plaintiffs claim that amount
contains the entirety of the 1993 advances, which advances were not all included in that amount.
See Peterson Supplemental Affidavit at W s 24, 30 and 31.

51635 PE8632 10
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Again, paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Statement of Purported Undisputed Facts is entirely
irrelevant to their present motion since there never was any kind of a joint venture arrangement
between Mr. Harrington and Mrs. Peterson. See Peterson Affidavit at ^ 52, and Peterson
Supplemental Affidavit at 5 17.
ARGUMENT
I.
The 1993 Advances by Mrs. Peterson Were Secured by Express
Provisions of the Purchase Money Trust Deed. Those Advances
Were Not New or Additional Loans of a Character Unrelated to
the Original Transaction and Therefore Are Not Governed
by the Language Relied Upon by Plaintiffs.
The Purchase Money Trust Deed, at the top of its page 2, lists four general categories
of items that are secured by that Trust Deed, as quoted above. Plaintiffs focus only on the third
of those four categories, and totally ignore all the remaining categories as though they did not
exist. To support their desired outcome, Plaintiffs isolate the language of that third category and
take it out of context, pretending that the other provisions do not exist. Only by doing so can
it be made to appear, improperly, that the 1993 advances were "additional loans" of the type
intended to be covered by that third category.
When one views all four of the categories together and in context, as they were meant
to be, it becomes clear that the third category addresses only new subsequent loans which are
unrelated and have nothing to do with the original amount secured by the Trust Deed. As thus
properly understood, it makes good sense that such new loans should not be secured by the

51635.PE8632.10
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original Trust Deed unless there is a new promissory note which expressly recites that it also
is secured by that original Trust Deed.
By contrast, categories one, two and four, addressing other amounts which are all secured
by the original Deed of Trust, without the necessity of new promissory notes referring to the
Trust Deed, comprise obligations which do relate and are tied to the original transaction.
Because Mrs. Peterson's later advances related to the purpose of the original transaction, and
fit one or more of the other three categories, they require no new promissory or other writing
to be secured by the Purchase Money Trust Deed.
Category one is the amount originally secured, but also extends to and includes
"modifications" of the original note. Mrs. Peterson's later advances are properly viewed as such
a modification.
The second category of items secured by the original Trust Deed relates to the
performance of each of the provisions of the Trust Deed which the Trustor, Harrington, agreed
to perform. Among other such provisions, Harrington agreed in paragraph one of the following
section "to complete . . . any building which may be constructed" on the property secured by
the Trust Deed. Further in that same paragraph, Harrington agreed "to pursue [construction of
improvements on the subject property] with reasonable diligence/to completion . . . ." Because
Mrs. Peterson's advances fulfilled the performance of Harrington's obligations, these advances
are also secured by the Purchase Money Trust Deed under this second category.
The fourth category of items secured by the Trust Deed is "the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant" to the terms of the Trust Deed, with

51635 PE8632 10
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interest thereon. Paragraph 7 of the following section of the Trust Deed expressly authorizes
Mrs. Peterson to take such action as she "may deem necessary to protect the security" of the
Trust Deed, including the expending of "whatever amounts in [her] absolute discretion [she] may
deem necessary," whenever Harrington failed to do any act which he obligated himself in the
Trust Deed to take. Seeing that construction remained incomplete when Harrington exhausted
his own resources, it was entirely reasonable for Mrs. Peterson to deem it necessary to protect
her security by making new advances, to complete that construction.
Finally, paragraph 8, at the bottom of page 2 of the Trust Deed, expressly obligated
Harrington to repay "all sums expended [under the Trust Deed] by the Beneficiary," and further
provided that said repayment was secured by the Trust Deed.
That clearly was the intention of Mrs. Peterson. Having naturally become apprehensive
about whether a premature sale of the property in its distressed condition, before construction
was substantially completed, would pay off the construction loan to which the Purchase Money
Trust Deed had temporarily been subordinated, and still leave enough to pay the obligation
owing to her, (1st Affidavit of Mrs. Peterson at K 21) she reacted in the way that any junior
lender with the ability would: she advanced further sums to complete construction, improve the
likelihood that the maximum market value of the subject property could be realized by sale, and
thereby sought to protect the security of the property which secured the obligations owing to her.
Had she ever believed that those advances would not have been thus secured by the subject
property, she had no reason to make those later advances. According to her Supplemental
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Affidavit, she would not have advanced those additional monies unless she believed them secured
by the property. Supplemental Affidavit of Mrs. Peterson at K 23.
That reasonable understanding and expectation of Mrs. Peterson is fully supported by the
language of the Purchase Money Deed of Trust.
The express language described above from the Purchase Money Trust Deed signed by
Mr. Harrington clearly was adequate, without any further writing of any kind, to cause all sums
which Mrs. Peterson advanced to complete construction of the home on the subject property to
be secured by that property, by virtue of the quoted provisions of the Deed of Trust.

To

accomplish that result, it was not even necessary that there be any later writing of any kind.
Thus, even without the December 8, 1992 Agreement and without the February 18, 1993 letter,
the sums of money advanced by Mrs. Peterson for the purpose of completing the construction
of the home on the subject property were all secured by that Purchase Money Trust Deed.
The only legal necessity for the December 8 Agreement and the February 1993 letter is
to supply the one item missing from the Purchase Money Deed of Trust: a stated rate of interest
for the later advances. Paragraph 8 at the bottom of page two of the Purchase Money Trust
Deed has a blank for an interest rate to be inserted, which was not filled in at the time it was
signed and recorded. This interest rate was supplied by the lat^r writings. The later writings
also memorialized the agreements of the parties to this action that the later advances were only
to be used for purposes of finishing construction on the subject property, not for other purposes.
Those later writings thereby confirmed that the later advances are within the provisions of the
first, second and fourth categories of items expressly secured by the Deed of Trust. Plaintiffs'
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arguments, which entirely overlook and ignore the provisions of the Purchase Money Trust Deed
quoted above, therefore miss their intended mark.
IL
Alternatively, the February 1993 Letter is Sufficient to Cause
the Advances Described Therein to be Secured.
Moreover, even if it could be seriously argued, contrary to the clear language of the
Purchase Money Deed of Trust, that Mrs. Peterson's later advancements required a new writing
in addition to the Purchase Money Deed of Trust to be secured by it, Plaintiffs have
misconstrued the February 8, 1993 letter. An examination of that letter shows it should properly
be viewed as the equivalent of both a promissory note and a grant of a security interest.
In relevant part, it recites that it confirms an agreement of Mr. Harrington, who signed
the letter, "that any money advanced by vou [Mrs. Peterson] above and beyond the $75,000.00
(December 8, 1992 Agreement), for the purpose of construction of the home located at 1656
South Sunset Oaks Drive, will be returned to you with interest consistent with the rate of interest
in our Agreement dated December 8, 1992 . . .." [Emphasis added]. That language clearly
conveys an undertaking by Mr. Harrington promising that any such loan by Mrs. Peterson would
be repaid to her in the manner described in the remainder of the letter. Such an engagement
meets the requirements necessary to constitute a promissory note.
The last sentence of the first paragraph states: 'The sale of the house will be the sole
source of the return of this money." Any lay person reading that sentence would understand that
language to be the equivalent of a grant of a security interest in the property which is the subject
of the Deed of Trust, and was so understood by Mrs. Peterson. Merely because more traditional
51635 PE8632 10

- 12 -

language typically used by lawyers in granting a deed of trust was not used, is no reason to
construe this language otherwise.
Accordingly, under any reasonable view of the documents which Mr. Harrington signed,
there is but one conclusion: the subject property described in the Purchase Money Trust Deed
secured not only the original purchase money, but also the later advances made by
Mrs. Peterson.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the Motion of Plaintiffs for
Partial Summary Judgment and should, instead, declare that all funds advanced by Mrs. Peterson
were secured by the Purchase Money Deed of Trust and thus enter an Order granting the Cross
Motion of Defendants on this point.
DATED this ^ 7

day of September, 1996.

m

Mangum
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants

51635.PE8632.10

- 13-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the U. -f day of September, 1996, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by causing the same to be mailed, via first-class
United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
James S. Jardine
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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